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  iDynamics of Networks If Everyone Strives for Structural Holes 
 
Abstract 
When entrepreneurs enter  “structural holes” in information networks, they can make a 
profit by exploiting the access and control benefits that these provide. That is Ronald 
Burt’s 13-year-old argument. Ever since, evidence for the suggested advantages from the 
occupancy of strategic network positions has steadily accumulated. What has not been 
shown, however, is whether those who strive for such structural advantages can actually 
obtain and maintain them. We ask what would happen if people followed Burt’s advice 
and indeed entered structural holes by manipulating their local networks in pursuit of 
access and control benefits. Using an explicit model of network entrepreneurship, we 
characterize the networks that are obtained after beneficial links have been added and 
costly ones removed, and we assess the returns that network entrepreneurs earn on their 
social capital investments in these networks. An important class of stable networks turns 
out to be “balanced complete bipartite networks.” In these networks, benefits are evenly 
distributed, so no one has a structural advantage. This result sharply contrasts with Burt’s 
typical example of what a network may look like after entrepreneurial activity, in which 
the majority of access and control benefits accrue to only one individual. 
 
  iiIntroduction 
Ideas about how positions in social networks are of use to people occupying them are 
abundant in sociology. The structure of one’s social environment has been shown to 
matter in a number of ways. Balanced triads generate less cognitive inconsistency (Heider 
1946; Krackhardt 1999). Job search through weak ties is more successful (Granovetter 
1995 [1974]). Non-excludable trading parties have larger profit margins (Cook and 
Emerson 1978; Willer 1999). Dense structures and closure in networks facilitate trust 
(Coleman 1988; Raub and Weesie 1990; Buskens 2002; Burt 2005a). And, ties between 
otherwise unconnected groups benefit the broker (Burt 1992). The last example will be 
the focus of this paper. 
  Those results constitute an important body of sociological regularities, but from 
an agency perspective, they are only half the story. They enable us to understand 
consequences of certain network positions, but not how actors manage to reach these 
positions. If some networks are more beneficial than others, actors can be expected to 
modify the less beneficial ones to their advantage (Flap 2003, pp. 12–13). By the mere 
non-atomic nature of networks, such actions will be interdependent and partly collective, 
and thus trigger non-trivial network evolution. Sociologists have only recently begun to 
explore this agency component of social network analysis in more detail (e.g., Doreian 
and Stokman 1997). In this paper, we will further develop theoretical insight into which 
networks can be expected to emerge when actors purposively choose their relationships. 
In particular, we develop a model in which actors strive for structural holes. 
  When Ronald Burt (1992) launched his idea of structural holes, he went beyond 
structuralism. He did not assume that actors would simply reap the fruits from structural 
  1advantages that they happen to have over others. He suggested the possibility that 
entrepreneurs, just as they can strategically put financial and human resources to work, 
exploit social resources and turn them into a profit: “You enter the structural hole 
between two players to broker the relationship between them” (Burt 1992, p. 34). Burt 
even went so far as to argue that social capital implies prior strategic networking: “I will 
treat motivation and opportunity as one and the same...a network rich in entrepreneurial 
opportunity surrounds a player motivated to be entrepreneurial. At the other extreme, a 
player innocent of entrepreneurial motive lives in a network devoid of entrepreneurial 
opportunity” (1992, p. 36). Burt’s “structural entrepreneur personality index” (2005a, p. 
34) is an attempt to quantify this inclination to exploit social resources.  
  Nevertheless, the agency component in Burt’s argument was never as fully 
developed as the structure component. Burt proposed a precise measure of structural 
advantage, the “constraint” formula (1992, p. 54), but the network dynamics he sketches 
in his book are instructions on how to unilaterally reduce one’s score on the constraint 
measure; he thereby neglects the interdependence between actors and possible cascades 
of subsequent network adaptations by other actors. Burt does not study what happens if 
multiple actors try to improve their network positions. Moreover, the book – and the 
subsequent literature – lacks a description of stable networks in which no entrepreneur 
can make any further improvement, i.e., networks from which no further social capital 
can be extracted. Burt deals with some of these issues informally in his forthcoming book 
(2005a, ch. 5). Although his considerations are very insightful, they lack a strict 
theoretical deduction. For example, he speculates on the emergence of stable networks if 
network benefits are extended beyond brokerage to include closure, if these benefits and 
  2also the costs of ties are heterogeneous among actors, and if network structure also 
changes randomly. We think that such speculation is unwarranted.  
We will limit ourselves to formalizing network dynamics with a single type of 
benefit, with homogeneous actors, and without random change. This, as we will see, is 
already quite challenging. Clearly, these are strong, simplifying assumptions, since 
strategic networking will be more salient in some settings than in others, and in any 
particular setting not everybody will be equally interested in occupying strong 
entrepreneurial positions. Still, our model provides an insightful benchmark that can 
straightforwardly be modified to accommodate more complex assumptions. 
In Burt’s typical example of a network after entrepreneurial activity, the majority 
of benefits are held by a single individual. But it is not obvious why others would not 
follow this first entrepreneur’s example, and what stable network structure would 
eventually result. Moreover, some economic studies of network dynamics in information 
and communication settings have identified the “star,” in which a single entrepreneur 
receives all of the profit, as the unique stable network (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996; Bala 
and Goyal 2000; Goyal and Vega-Redondo 2004). In this paper, we show that the “star” 
is not stable if everyone tries to minimize their network constraint. By pursuing the 
following aims, we reach this conclusion. 
  Our first aim is to model the network entrepreneurship that Burt suggests and to 
characterize stable networks. This enables us to study the distribution of profits in these 
stable networks and the possibility that actors can profit from strategic networking. This 
requires an appropriate choice of a model of network formation, including a stability 
concept indicating in which networks no actor can further improve his network position. 
  3We model Burtian network dynamics after the actor-based approaches of Myerson 
(1991), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Snijders (1996, 2001, 2005), and Gould (2002). A 
secondary aim is to propose a stability concept for general use in actor-based models of 
network formation. 
  We first review the structural hole argument and the dynamic networks literature. 
Then we introduce a model of network entrepreneurship, explain our stability concept, 
and identify two types of stable networks. Using simulation, we show that one of these 
two types – balanced complete bipartite networks – evolves with a much higher 
likelihood than the other. 
  
Structural Holes 
Structural holes are “disconnections or nonequivalencies between players” and hence 
“entrepreneurial opportunities for information access, timing, referrals and control” (Burt 
1992, p. 2). There exists a structural hole between two players if there is a potential for 
beneficial information flow between them. The word “disconnections” in the above 
definition refers to the absence of a tie or path through which the information can flow. 
A network rich in structural holes thus contains many exploitable brokering 
opportunities: “The structural hole is an opportunity to broker the flow of information 
between people and to control the form of projects that bring together people from 
opposite sides of the hole” (1997, p. 340). The network entrepreneur recognizes these 
opportunities and places himself in the hole by initiating ties with both players. Just as the 
investment banker and the human resource manager generate returns from financial and 
human capital, so does the network entrepreneur seek rents in information structure. 
  4“When you take the opportunity to be the tertius, you are an entrepreneur in the literal 
sense of the word – a person who generates profit from being between others” (1992, p. 
34). Occupying the hole and being essential to the information flow between the two, the 
entrepreneur can charge a brokering fee. 
Burt introduced a formula for quantifying the benefits from spanning structural 
holes, the “constraint” measure. Entrepreneurial opportunities are considered constrained 
if there exists a feasible alternative road along which the information you are intending to 
broker can travel: “Contact j constrains your entrepreneurial opportunities to the extent 
that: (a) you’ve made a large investment of time and energy to reach j, and (b) j is 
surrounded by few structural holes with which you could negotiate to get a favorable 
return on the investment” (1992, p. 54).
2 The constraint measure ci captures the extent to 
which this is the case for each contact j of actor i: 
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where pij is the proportion of time i has invested in contact j. Burt assumes that an actor 
distributes his time equally over his contacts: If i is connected to j, pij = 1/di, where di is 
actor i’s degree. If i and j are not connected, pij = 0. ci lies between 0 and 9/8 (a proof for 
ci having this range can be obtained from the authors) and is 0 for isolates. This implies 
that isolates have the lowest constraint. It seems more plausible, though, that it is better to 
be connected in some way than not to be connected at all, and we think Burt did not 
                                                 
2 In recent work (e.g., Burt 2005a), Burt multiplies his index with 100 to compare integer values 
of the index. We will use the original formulation in this paper. Of course, both formalizations are 
equivalent. 
  5intend isolates to be least constrained. Therefore, we additionally assume that ci = 2 
(greater than 9/8) for isolates.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The higher the score on this measure ci, the more structural opportunities are 
constrained, and as a result, the lower the network benefits. Consider as an example 
figure 1. In the network on the left, actor A is essential for all information flow. His 
constraint score is cA = 4 (¼ + 0)
2 = ¼. In the middle network, B and C can also 
communicate directly rather than through A. This constrains the relations between A and 
B and A and C. A’s constraint score is now cA = 2 (¼ + 0)
2 + 2 (¼ + ¼ ½)
2 = 13/32. In 
fact, a network without one of the two “redundant” ties with B and C would be better for 
A (on redundancy, see Burt 1992, p. 51). In the network on the right, A’s constraint is 
lower, namely cA = 3 (⅓ + 0)
2 = ⅓ < 13/32. Therefore, actor A is willing to give up his 
relation with C in the middle network of figure 1 and move to the network on the right.   
The constraint formula has been found negatively related to a wide range of 
objective indicators of success (see Burt 2000, 2002, and 2005a for extensive reviews). 
Producer profit margins are larger for firms in buyer-supplier networks (Burt et al. 2002; 
Talmud 1994; Yasuda 1996). Jobs are more desirable (Bian 1994; Leenders and Gabbay 
1999; Lin 1999; Lin et al. 2001). Salaries are higher (Burt 1997, 1998; Podolny and 
Baron 1997; Burt, Hogarth, and Michaud 2000; Mehra et al. 2001; Mizruchi and Sterns 
2001). And negative correlations have been found with positive performance evaluations, 
peer reputations, promotions, and good ideas (Gabbay 1997; Burt 2001, 2004). Given that 
  6this evidence indicates a (negative) association between the constraint formula and 
network benefits, we use constraint as an (reverse) indicator for the utility actors can 
extract from a network. 
 
Dynamic Networks 
What the evidence above does not tell us is whether investments in brokerage relations 
pay off. Burt has suggested, but not shown, that those who remove redundant ties and add 
non-redundant ones will eventually obtain the returns on these investments. Current 
network manipulations that lead to an improved network position in the short run may 
trigger subsequent changes by others that could ultimately make oneself worse off. This 
temporal interdependence in decision making is not trivial, and its examination requires 
an explicit model. Recently, some models have been proposed to examine such dynamics. 
These models can be categorized into two approaches, both of which we review. Earlier 
reviews of models of network dynamics can be found in, e.g., Weesie and Flap (1990), 
Doreian and Stokman (1997), Stokman and Doreian (2001), Dutta and Jackson (2003), 
Breiger et al. (2003), and Jackson (2003). In the first approach, network dynamics are a 
process in which structure changes as a result of probabilistic processes, while in the 
second approach, networks evolve as a consequence of tie changes made by purposive 
actors.
3 Our model is of the latter type.  
In the former approach, tie formation is an event, such as an introduction to one’s 
friend’s friend or the sharing of information. Ties represent the long-lasting effects of 
                                                 
3 “E-state structuralism” (Fararo and Skvoretz 1986; Skvoretz et al. 1996) constitutes a hybrid of 
these two approaches. Networks change as a result of actors’ behavior, but this behavior is not 
network manipulation itself. 
  7these events and will never disappear; from now on you will know your friend’s friend or 
you will be informed, respectively. The probability of the event depends on the current 
network structure. Two people are more likely to be introduced to each other the more 
they have both been introduced to other people beforehand, and they may more readily 
share information if they have done so previously. Watts (1999) and Barabasi and Albert 
(1999) propose scenarios in which ties are added to an empty network. Watts states that 
“small worlds” constitute the end result of a process that takes some middle position 
between two extreme scenarios – one where new ties are established between two 
individuals only through the introduction by a shared friend, and one where new 
friendships are made at random. Barabasi and Albert argue that small worlds are created 
following a “power law”: Nodes are more likely to connect with nodes that already have 
many connections. One example they offer is the establishment of new links between 
websites. Carley’s (1991) constructualist model of group formation is also based on a 
probabilistic notion of social interaction, even though individuals’ preferential attachment 
is implicit. Individuals share information. Those who have more knowledge in common 
are assumed to be more likely to interact. Since interaction leads to even more shared 
knowledge, and so on, the equilibrium in her model is separate cliques that have fully 
common knowledge. Robins et al. (2005) give an overview of this line of network 
dynamics research and provide a rather advanced study in this category themselves. 
Employing well-known sociological network principles in their model of network 
formation, such as the tendency toward triadic closure, they find that small-world 
networks might emerge, but a wide range of other types of structures are also possible. 
  8The second approach to network formation is one where actors try to optimize or 
improve their network position, assuming they obtain a certain utility from occupying 
that position. Clearly, a model of this type better fits the network formation process that 
we have set out to explicate than a probabilistic model. Burt’s network entrepreneurs are 
precisely such optimizing actors, with brokerage benefits as network-derived utility. 
A classic study that takes this approach is Cartwright and Harary (1956). They 
show that Heider’s (1946) balancing principles for friendship formation would always 
lead to two entirely segregated groups. Lacking a specification of the dynamics through 
which these equilibria would be obtained, their study was elaborated by others who 
proposed various models of network formation (cf. Doreian and Mrvar 1996; Hummon 
and Doreian 2003; Wang and Thorngate 2003). In each of these models, an actor is 
randomly selected to add or delete a tie that involves him. Macy et al. (2004) model 
Heiderian balancing processes as a dynamic network process in which opinions of actors 
and ties between actors change simultaneously. They find that segregation is highest with 
an intermediate number of opinion dimensions.  
Another classic example of actors’ consciously trying to improve their network 
position is Schelling’s model of residential segregation (1969, 1971). Actors move if they 
can find a vacant place whose location they prefer over that of their present residence. 
Bonacich (2004) analyzes the dynamics of exchange networks with a Schelling-like 
checkerboard model. What makes this model less suitable for our purposes is that the 
structure of the social environment is predefined (i.e., on a checkerboard) and that actors 
cannot choose relations freely, but can only search for empty spots on the checkerboard.  
  9The models that allow for free choice of ties and various forms of calculative 
behavior of actors are similar to the model we will propose subsequently; we will review 
them in a bit more detail. There exist two subclasses of models of this kind. First are 
equilibrium models in which actors simultaneously propose ties to other actors. They can 
select any combination of actors they wish. Actors derive utility from their positions in 
the resulting network. Stable networks are those that are induced by Nash equilibria, 
combinations of strategies that are each a best response to the strategies of the other 
actors. Gould (2002) proposed such a model to explain the emergence of status 
hierarchies. His model is special in the sense that actors are allowed to propose a level of 
attachment to all other actors. Utility depends on this level of attachment, the status of the 
actors that one connects to, and the extent to which attachment is reciprocated. A 
prominent instance of this type of model in economics is Bala and Goyal (2000), in 
which actors can unilaterally link to others and derive utility from the number of other 
actors they are directly or indirectly linked to. 
In both Gould’s model and that of Bala and Goyal, any initiative toward other 
actors has direct consequences in terms of the utility these other actors derive from their 
choices. However, we will assume that ties are formed only if both actors want to 
connect. This assumption is based on the idea that relevant information can be exchanged 
only if both actors agree to come together and talk. No one can force a tie upon anyone 
else. Myerson (1991, p. 448) proposed a model that uses this assumption. All actors 
simultaneously propose ties. Ties that are mutually proposed are formed, and actors 
derive utility from the resulting network. This type of model, which we will call the 
Gould-Myerson (GM) model, is attractive but has one important drawback: It shortcuts 
  10the network dynamics. Instead of representing network evolution as a continuous process 
in which one actor can react to changes by other actors elsewhere in the network, it 
assumes that all actors make their decisions simultaneously and that these decisions are 
binding. There are often numerous equilibria, and the lack of a specification of the 
network evolution process then leaves one unable to identify the network that is most 
likely to evolve. From an evolutionary viewpoint, many of these equilibria can hardly be 
considered stable networks. We will show later that we can identify a subset of these 
equilibria that have more appealing stability properties. These stability properties can be 
explained by describing adaptive processes through which actors solve coordination 
problems and reach specific equilibrium networks. The second subclass of actor-oriented 
models of network formation specifies such network evolution processes as well. 
In sociology, Snijders (1996, 2001) develops methods for the statistical analysis 
of longitudinal network data. These models allow one to test hypotheses on the specific 
utility function that actors optimize when making changes to the network. Snijders’s 
statistical model has been applied to, for example, the emergence and stability of 
friendship networks (Zeggelink et al. 1996; Van der Bunt et al. 1999; Whitmeyer 2002). 
The model assumes that actors are randomly selected one by one and given the 
opportunity to remove or add one tie. Actors then investigate whether some change 
increases their utility. If so, they make that change; if not, they leave the network as it is. 
Originally, the model assumed that tie formation was unilateral, and thus each actor could 
force a tie upon some other actor. These ties were directed; an example would be a phone 
call. In the latest editions, one can also specify a model in which ties are undirected and 
  11formed only if both actors want that tie.
4 This particular scenario is implied by Jackson 
and Wolinsky’s (1996) concept of “pairwise stability.” A network is pairwise stable if no 
pair of actors wishes to connect and no single actor wishes to remove a tie. Although 
sequential tie formation under mutual consent reaches stasis only once a pairwise stable 
network has formed, Jackson and Wolinsky do not explicitly mention this model of 
network formation in their original article. In this type of model, which we will call the 
Snijders-Jackson-Wolinsky (SJW) model, actors are myopic; they do not consider what 
other actors will change after they make a change themselves. In the GM model, in 
contrast, the actors consider all other actors’ possible actions in a setting in which 
everyone chooses all desired ties simultaneously and only once. We will show later on 
that the SJW and GM models can be unified despite these differences. 
 
A Model of Network Entrepreneurship 
Burt’s (1992) network entrepreneurs are actors who change structure in pursuit of greater 
network-derived benefits. A model of network entrepreneurship should therefore be of 
the second type. Moreover, we can use the explicit formula that Burt used to quantify an 
actor’s lack of network benefits, the aforementioned constraint measure. Through 
alterations of their network positions, actors maximize utility, which should be decreasing 
with the score of that individual on the constraint measure. The literature provides two 
candidate models for such network entrepreneurship, the GM model and the SJW model. 
As we will show now, these models can be unified.  
                                                 
4 To make statistical estimation possible, Snijders adds a random utility component to the utility 
function of actors. Note that including noise in actor-oriented models of network formation 
moves them one, probably realistic, step toward the purely probabilistic models. 
  12  We first introduce the necessary notation. Let n ≥ 2 be the number of actors, 
 the set of actors, and X the n times n adjacency matrix with xij indicating 
the tie strength of the connection from i to j. 
{ n N ,..., 2 , 1 = }
∑ =
j
ij i x d is actor i’s degree. 
  In the GM model, each actor proposes whom he wants to be connected to. si ∈ 
{0,1}
(n − 1) is a pure strategy of actor i. The utility function ui(s) assigns a numerical value 
to each strategy profile s. Gould considers Nash equilibrium as stability concept. 
 
Definition 1. A strategy profile s* is a Nash equilibrium if ui(s*) ≥ ui(si, s*-i) for all i and 
si, where s*-i  is the set of all strategy vectors in s* excluding the one of i.  
 
Moreover, Burt’s ties are non-reflexive, so xii = 0 for all i, they are undirected, so xij = xji 
for all i and j, and they are unvalued, so xij ∈ {0, 1}. Let g
N = {ij | i < j∈N} denote the 
complete network of all non-reflexive, undirected, and unvalued connections ij. Let g + ij 
denote network g with the tie ij added to it and g − ij denotes network g with tie ij 
removed. We say that the strategy profile s induces the network g ⊆ g
N if ij ∈ g ⇔ sij = sji 
= 1; i.e., only ties that are proposed by both actors are part of the network. The network 
constraint formula depends only on the network formed and not on the ties proposed. 
Therefore, we assume that proposing ties is costless. This implies that the utility function 
ui(s) is the same for combinations of strategies that induce the same network. Formally, 
the utility function has the property that ui(s’) = ui(s’’) if s’ and s’’ induce the same 
network g. With some abuse of notation, we can also write ui(g) as the utility of a certain 
network g, given that it does not matter precisely what strategies induce this network. 
  13Specifying the model for our purposes, actor i’s utility is a decreasing function of the 
constraint measure ci as indicated above, e.g. ui(g) = − ci(g).
5 
Now, we define as a first stability concept the Nash network:  
 
Definition 2. A network g* is a Nash network if some s* inducing g* is a Nash 
equilibrium.  
 
Nash network is a rather weak stability concept for undirected networks, since many 
networks that can hardly be considered stable are included. The problem is that if one 
actor does not propose a tie to another, the second actor has no incentive to propose a tie 
to the first, because a tie is formed only if it is proposed by both actors at the same time. 
No one can increase his utility through any proposal if no one else is proposing ties, 
which makes “nobody proposing any tie” a Nash equilibrium. The network induced by 
this set of strategies is the empty network, and this is a Nash network. Given our utility 
function, every pair of actors wants to initiate the first tie in the empty network, because 
isolates have the lowest possible utility. Thus, many Nash equilibria are due to trivial 
coordination problems. 
In the SJW model, such coordination problems do not exist. This model asks what 
an actor would change given the current status of the network if he were offered that 
possibility. An actor is allowed to delete a tie or add a tie with permission from the new 
                                                 
5 We make the strong assumption here that reducing network constraint is the only utility 
argument for all actors and that the utility derived from a lack of constraint is the same for all 
actors. We thereby neglect other utility arguments related to, e.g., closure (Burt 2005a, ch. 3) and 
indirect brokerage (Burt 2005b). Neither do we investigate the effects of heterogeneity among 
actors (see Burt 2005a, ch. 1.4), and in our model, the value of brokerage is not only an effect but 
a goal as well (cf. Burt 2005a, pp. 240–41). We will consider these issues in more detail in the 
discussion section. 
  14contact; i.e., it does not make this other actor worse off. Stability is reached if no actor 
can profitably delete a tie or add an acceptable tie. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) call this 
pairwise stability: 
 
Definition 3. A network g is pairwise stable if both 
(i)   and  ,    () ( ) () ( ) ii j j i j g u gu g i ju gu g i j ∀∈ ≥ − ∧ ≥ −
(ii) ( ) ( ) ,    ( ) () ( ) () ( ) () ( ) () . ii j j j j ii i jg u gi j u g ugi j ug ugi j ug u gi j u g ∀∉ + > ⇒ + < ∧ + > ⇒ + <  
 
Condition (i) states that no actor wants to sever a tie, and condition (ii) states that no pair 
of actors wishes to add a tie. On the one hand, pairwise stability has the advantage that 
pairs of actors can add ties if they both want to have a tie, which seems a clear indication 
that a network is unstable, since networks can be Nash networks despite this possibility. 
On the other hand, the disadvantage of pairwise stability is that it does not consider the 
simultaneous removal of multiple ties. If an actor would profit from removing two ties, 
this network could never be a Nash network in the GM game, because not proposing 
these two ties would have been a better strategy. Networks can be pairwise stable despite 
profitable deviations that involve multiple ties, even though such deviations arguably 
make a network less stable. Thus, Nash networks in the GM model and pairwise stable 
networks in the SJW model both contain a subset of networks that could be considered 
unstable.  
That makes the intersection of these two sets of networks a candidate for an 
appropriate set of stable networks. Goyal and Joshi (2004) introduced the concept of 
pairwise Nash in the GM model, which corresponds to the intersection of Nash networks 
  15and pairwise stable networks (see also Cálvo-Armengol 2004). Gilles and Sarangi (2004) 
call the same stability concept strong pairwise stability using the SJW model. In words, 
pairwise Nash networks are networks in which (i) no actor wants to delete a subset of his 
ties and (ii) no pair of actors wants to add a tie between them. But clearly, there is an 
asymmetry here: An actor can delete all his ties but add only one tie – if that tie does not 
make the other actor worse off. 
Even more problematic is the assumption in that actors do not simultaneously add 
and delete ties. For example, pairwise Nash implies that an actor does not contemplate 
improving his network position by replacing one contact with another. This, however, 
seems a rather straightforward change in a network. To resolve the problems of 
asymmetry and non-simultaneity in the deletion and addition of ties, we introduce our 
own stability concept, “unilateral stability.” In our definition of this concept we use the 
concept of “unilateral obtainability”: 
 
Definition 4. A network g' ⊆ g
N is unilaterally obtainable from g by i through S ⊆ N \{i} 
if  
(i)  { } i S k j i k i j g g g jk + ⊆ ∧ = ∨ = ∩ ∈ ∀ , ) ( ), ' '\(  
(ii)    ) ( ), ' ( \ i k i j g g g jk = ∨ = ∩ ∈ ∀
 
One network is unilaterally obtainable from another by a proposing actor i and through a 
subgroup S, if each tie that is added or deleted involves actor i and if each tie that is 
added involves also a member of S. That is, a network is unilaterally obtainable from 
  16another network if we can pick one actor from the initial network, give him a new set of 
ties and then we obtain the new network. Now, we can define our core stability concept. 
 
Definition 5. A network g ⊆ g
N is unilaterally stable if ∀i, ∀S ⊆ N \{i}, ∀g’⊆ g
N 
unilaterally obtainable from g by i through S, ui(g’) > ui(g) ⇒ uj(g’) < uj(g) for some j ∈ 
S. 
 
In words, a network is called unilaterally stable if no actor i can change the ties that he is 
involved in himself such that two conditions are fulfilled: (i) i is strictly better off; (2) 
none of the actors in S to whom actor i proposes a new tie is worse off than in the original 
network. Unilateral stability is defined here in terms of the SJW model. It can also be 
formulated as a refinement of Nash equilibrium in the GM model, in which case we refer 
to “initiative proof” Nash equilibria (see AUTHOR 2005). Hence, the concept of 
unilateral stability can be used in both models. From the definitions, it is clear that all 
unilaterally stable networks are pairwise Nash, and all pairwise Nash networks are 
pairwise stable.  
 
Networks of Structural Entrepreneurs 
We now identify networks to which no entrepreneur can profitably make any further 
change. Our first result states that two actors will always connect if they have no shared 
contacts. 
 
  17Theorem 1. Adding a tie without creating closed triads is always beneficial for both 
actors involved in the new tie. 
 
Proof. For purposes of legibility, we moved all proofs to the Appendix. 
 
Theorem 1 establishes the unconditional benefits from brokerage. If an actor adds a tie 
without creating a closed triad, then this actor will be on the shortest path between the 
new contact and all the contacts the actor already had. And vice versa, the new partner 
comes to mediate the information the focal actor receives and passes this along to his old 
contacts. Scores on the constraint measures of both actors drop. The added value of an 
additional tie decreases as more ties are added because an actor has to distribute his time 
among more neighbors and can thus broker less information per pair of neighbors, but 
this marginal utility never becomes zero. 
  As we will see below, the reverse of theorem 1 is not true. Sometimes actors want 
to add ties that cause closed triads, and networks with triads can even be pairwise stable. 
We did not encounter any unilaterally stable network with closed triads, but we could not 
prove that they do not exist. 
 
Corollary 1. The shortest path between any pair of actors in a pairwise stable network 
has length less than or equal to 2. 
 
The shortest path between two actors can be of length 2 or less only if both actors are 
directly connected or can reach each other through a broker. If neither condition obtains 
  18for some pair of actors, then these actors can add a tie without creating a closed triad, 
which is profitable by theorem 1. Note that since pairwise stability is a weaker stability 
concept than unilateral stability, corollary 1 also holds for unilaterally stable networks. 
 
Corollary 2. A network of disconnected parts cannot be pairwise stable. 
 
A network of disconnected parts contains many brokerage opportunities. Every 
entrepreneur wants to add a tie to someone in another part because that tie will never 
create a closed triad. Such networks can therefore not be pairwise stable (and, 
consequently, not unilaterally stable, either). The following set of definitions describes a 
family of networks that includes important stable networks. 
 
Definition 6.  
•  An m-partite network is a network in which the actors can be divided into m 
groups such that there are no ties within these groups.  
•  A complete m-partite network is an m-partite network in which all the 
possible ties between the actors in the m groups exist (see Wasserman and 
Faust 1994, p. 120).  
•  A balanced m-partite network is an m-partite network such that the difference 
between the number of actors in the largest group and the number of actors in 
the smallest group is at most 1. 
•  If m = 2, m-partite networks are called bipartite networks. 
•  If m > 2, m-partite networks are called multipartite networks. 
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Now we can formulate the following corollary of theorem 1.  
 
Corollary 3. Pairwise stable networks that are bipartite networks are necessarily 
complete bipartite networks (otherwise some actors are at a distance greater than 2 and 
one can add ties without creating closed triads). 
 
Let us take a closer look at complete bipartite networks. The network on the left in figure 
1 is an example of a complete bipartite network. Actors B, C, D, and E form a first group, 
actor A a second. There are no within-group ties: B, C, D, and E are not directly 
connected to one another. All between-group ties are present: A is tied to B, C, D, and E. 
We will call complete bipartite networks in which one group contains only one actor – 
such as the example network – “stars.” 
 
Definition 7. A star is a complete bipartite network in which one of the groups consists 
of only one actor. 
 
Corollary 3 says that in order for a bipartite network to be stable, it will have to be 
complete. Otherwise there would be a brokerage opportunity. As the reader can verify, 
eliminating any tie in the example network makes both actors involved in that tie worse 
off: Actor A would have constraint ⅓ instead of ¼, and the other actor would become an 
isolate. The next result states that the example network we just described is not pairwise 
Nash, despite its completeness. 
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Theorem 2. A complete bipartite network of size n is pairwise Nash, unless it is a star 
with n > 4. 
 
Theorem 2 identifies an important class of pairwise Nash networks, and thus also of 
pairwise stable networks. As soon as both groups in a bipartite network consist of at least 
two actors and it is complete, this network is pairwise stable. The example network is a 
star with n = 5, and by theorem 2 it is not pairwise stable. The reason is that any two 
peripheral actors may wish to connect: B and C lower their constraint from 1 to 61/64 if 
they connect, even though this tie is redundant. This is a property of Burt’s constraint 
formula. In some cases, when the broker has many ties and can therefore spend little time 
passing information, it is better to establish a direct connection. This is what happens in 
the example network. B and C connect because A spends too much time with D and E. 
The middle network in figure 1 evolves. Given the argument for instability of larger stars, 
it is surprising that in other unbalanced complete bipartite networks actors in the larger 
groups never have an incentive to connect. If one broker can be too busy, then why 
cannot two?  
Clearly, in no bipartite network does an actor want to remove one or more ties, 
since the network is void of closed triads. This illustrates the weakness of the concept of 
Nash network: All bipartite networks, incomplete and complete, are Nash networks. 
Complete bipartite networks have another nice property, namely that they are 
efficient in the Pareto sense.  
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is worse off and at least one actor is better off. 
 
If our actors could cooperate and enforce agreements – which we have assumed they 
cannot – then they would not be able to leave a Pareto-efficient network. There would 
always be some actor vetoing a transition. The following theorem tells us that the class of 
stable networks identified in theorem 2 is Pareto-efficient. 
 
Theorem 3. Complete bipartite networks are Pareto-efficient. 
 
It may be the case that complete bipartite networks are the only efficient networks, but 
we were not able to prove this conjecture. We did verify that this conjecture holds for 
networks up to size 8. 
  We now specify a necessary and sufficient condition under which complete 
bipartite networks are not only pairwise stable but also unilaterally stable. 
 
Theorem 4. A complete bipartite network is unilaterally stable if and only if it is 
balanced. 
 
Theorems 3 and 4 together identify a class of networks that are efficient and stable under 
the strictest stability condition. In a complete bipartite network with a minimal difference 
in group size (i.e., groups are of equal size for an even number of actors and differ by 
only one actor in the case of an odd number of actors), no actor can profit from deleting 
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obtainable or non-obtainable, without another actor being made worse off. Figure 2 
shows the 10-actor balanced complete bipartite network. We were able to identify a 
second class of pairwise stable networks. 
 
Theorem 5. All complete multipartite networks are pairwise stable if the groups are of 
equal size and contain more than one actor. 
 
Figure 2 shows the Octahedron, which meets the theorem 5 requirements. There are three 
pairs of unconnected actors, each of which constitutes a group. Note that this network is 
neither unilaterally stable nor pairwise Nash. If he deletes two ties, an actor’s constraint 
drops from 9/16 to 1/2. The network is nevertheless pairwise stable because if an actor is 
allowed to delete only a single tie, he prefers to keep it. His constraint then increases to 
43/72. Because the deletion of two ties makes an actor better off, this network is not a 
Nash equilibrium of this game using the GM-model. Therefore, this is also an indication 
that pairwise stability might be a bit too weak a stability concept. Moreover, the 
Octahedron is extremely inefficient. All actors would fare better in the six-actor balanced 
complete bipartite network, which gives each actor constraint ⅓. More generally, this 
class of complete multipartite networks consists of inefficient pairwise stable networks 
and thus constitutes a set of “social traps.” 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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We have identified two classes of networks to which structural entrepreneurship gives 
rise. First, in balanced complete bipartite networks, each pair is connected either directly 
or at distance 2 via ½n possible brokers. They contain no redundant ties, but no one has 
entrepreneurial advantages, since everyone is brokering the same number of only 
indirectly connected pairs. Also, if Burt’s constraint formula correctly quantifies 
brokerage benefits, they are Pareto-efficient. No alternative network makes one actor 
better off without making another worse off. Second, in the multipartite networks of 
theorem 5, all pairs are brokered, and in addition, the majority of pairs are directly 
connected. These networks contain many redundant ties and are consequently Pareto-
inefficient. Every actor would fare better in the balanced complete bipartite network of 
the same size. Yet these multipartite networks are pairwise stable. No entrepreneur can 
profitably add or delete a single tie. 
  On the basis of our analysis, we could expect either type of network to arise in a 
world in which entrepreneurs pursue access and control benefits by changing ties one by 
one. Simulating such a world enables us to investigate which of the two types of 
networks is more likely to emerge. Such simulations also help us identify potential 
pairwise stable structures that the two classes of networks mentioned above do not cover.  
The simulation we built executes the following steps: 
1.  Start from some network. 
2.  Randomly select one actor who is allowed to delete a tie or add a tie and can 
count on the consent of the actor to whom he wants to add a tie. 
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network (if more ties lead to the same reduction in constraint, he chooses 
randomly between the options; if he cannot make a change that strictly 
reduces his constraint, he does not change anything).  
4.  Repeat steps 2 and 3 until no actor can profitably delete or, with consent, add 
a tie.  
Networks that are formed after these steps have been executed are necessarily pairwise 
stable; otherwise they could not have passed step 4. We first ran such simulations starting 
with each of the 13,597 non-isomorphic networks of sizes 2 through 8. This allowed us to 
identify all pairwise stable networks for these network sizes, since whenever the initial 
network was pairwise stable, the simulation ended instantly. For each of these networks, 
we checked whether they were unilaterally stable as well. 
Table 1 shows the number of stable networks by network size and stability 
concept. Figure 2 displays some of the interesting examples of stable networks. For n = 2, 
we have the connected pair as the only pairwise stable network. For n = 3, the three-line 
is the only pairwise stable network. For n = 4, the “Box” is the only pairwise stable 
network. For n = 5, there are two pairwise stable networks, the Pentagon and the five-
actor 2,3-complete bipartite network, which are both unilaterally stable. For n = 6, there 
are four pairwise stable networks: the 2,4-complete bipartite and the 3,3-complete 
bipartite as well as the “Bag” (see figure 2) and the Octahedron. The Octahedron is not 
pairwise Nash, and only the 3,3-complete bipartite network is unilaterally stable. For n = 
7, there are three pairwise stable networks, including the 2,5-complete bipartite and the 
3,4-complete bipartite. The latter is also unilaterally stable. For n = 8, there are seven 
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complete bipartite, the “Twisted Cube” (see figure 2), the complete 4-partite network, and 
two other networks. The three densest networks, including the balanced complete 4-
partite network, are not pairwise Nash. The twisted cube is the second unilaterally stable 
network for n = 8, in addition to the balanced complete bipartite network. Note that the 
twisted cube is a regular structure in which everyone has three ties and occupies a 
regularly equivalent (Wasserman and Faust 1994, pp. 473–74) position with all the 
others. 
In addition, we checked which of the more than 12 million non-isomorphic 
networks of sizes 9 and 10 fulfilled a specific stability condition. In this way, we found 9 
pairwise stable networks for n = 9 and 14 pairwise stable networks for n = 10. The 
unilaterally stable structures for n = 10 are the balanced complete bipartite network and 
another regular network in which every actor has four ties. Finally, for sizes 11 through 
16, we checked whether the networks that resulted from the simulations were unilaterally 
stable as well. The results are also summarized in table 1. For these network sizes, it is 
not guaranteed that every pairwise stable network has been found, because not all starting 
networks were considered.
6 In fact, we know from the analytical results that some 
networks that we did not find in the simulations are nevertheless pairwise stable. This is 
why for some network sizes, the lower bound of the number of pairwise stable networks 
(table 1) exceeds the number of networks found in the simulations (table 2). Still, these 
results show that the number of pairwise stable networks per network size is very small 
                                                 
6 Checking all structures for n = 10 took about 5 days with our software and computers, which 
implies that for n = 11 it would take about 500 days. 
  26and increases only slowly with network size. There is no network size for which we 
identified more than two unilaterally stable networks.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
To further investigate the likelihood of emergence of certain pairwise stable networks 
through an adaptive process, we drew a subsample of networks stratified on density for 
network size n = 9 through 25. We used all networks for densities with a small number of 
different networks but drew a random sample of connected networks for other densities. 
We never let a simulation start from a disconnected network, but since disconnected 
networks cannot be pairwise stable by corollary 2 and since the minimal density of 
pairwise stable networks seems to be around 0.4, not starting from the sparsest networks 
is not problematic. We decrease the number of networks per network density for larger 
network sizes, in order to have comparable numbers of networks per network size.
7 In 
sum, in our construction of the set of initial networks, we attempt to minimize bias 
toward networks of a particular density while keeping the set feasibly small (for a 
complete overview of the sampling, see AUTHOR 2005). For each network, we let the 
simulation converge to pairwise stability twice. Convergence always occurs, and it does 
so reasonably fast. For n = 25, the maximum number of iterations to reach a pairwise 
stable network is just above 200.  
                                                 
7 Numbers of sampled networks per density are decreased at n = 13 and n = 17. As a result, there 
is a drop in sampled networks at n = 13 and n = 17 and an increase thereafter due to the 
increasing number of different densities if the network is larger. 
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several important observations. The number of pairwise stable networks increases as n 
increases, although not entirely monotonically. Clearly, the number of pairwise stable 
networks is very small compared with the number of existing networks. The simulation 
shows that the balanced complete bipartite network is by far the most likely to emerge 
from the simulation. The less equal the group sizes of a complete bipartite network are, 
the less likely it emerges in the simulation. Table 2 shows the proportions of simulations 
from which the most equal and the second most equal complete bipartite networks 
emerge as pairwise stable networks. These two networks cover about 85% of the 
resulting networks, except for some cases in which n is small (all percentages are taken 
out of the networks of a particular size). If n is odd, the balanced complete bipartite 
network alone even accounts for 75–80% of the resulting pairwise stable networks. There 
are no other pairwise stable networks that obtain in a large proportion of simulations 
except for the Pentagon (19%) and the third pairwise stable network for n = 7 (34%).
8 For 
n > 8, no other network occurs in more than 8% of the simulations, and for n > 16, in no 
more than 3%. Strikingly, the other unilaterally stable networks that are not bipartite do 
not emerge in larger percentages than other pairwise stable networks. The twisted cube, 
for example, occurs in only 1% of the simulations for n = 8. Complete multipartite 
networks are obtained in only a negligible number of cases. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
8 This network has two groups of three actors who are all tied to each other as in the 3,3-complete 
bipartite network, except that two actors (one in each group) are tied not to each other but both to 
the seventh actor. 
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The density of pairwise stable networks varies between 0.4 and 0.9. Another question is 
whether we can predict the structure of the outcome network from the properties of the 
ingoing network. Because the dynamic process toward pairwise stable networks does not 
vary much in terms of the outcome networks, we restrict ourselves here to the 
relationship between density of the ingoing network and the resulting network. Not 
surprisingly, denser starting networks lead to denser pairwise stable networks. Pairwise 
stable multipartite networks will thus be somewhat more likely to emerge if we start from 
very dense networks. Furthermore, one can see from table 2 that the correlation between 
the two densities increases with network size.  
It should be noted that the correlations as well as the proportions presented in 
table 2 are contingent upon the sample of networks that is used. However, the findings 
are so strong and the prevalence of the balanced complete bipartite networks is so 
obvious that we do not really worry about this. One thing we did was weight networks for 
n < 9 by the inverse of the size of the isomorphism group that they represented.
9 The 
statistics then correspond with a sample of random networks. This left the substantive 
result – that the balanced complete bipartite network is the strongest attractor – 
unaffected. 
 
                                                 
9 Sizes of isomorphism groups were determined using Nauty 2.2 (see McKay 1990). 
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We have attempted to explicitly model Burt’s network entrepreneurship: Optimize 
relationships in terms of brokerage opportunities, initiate relationships with others who 
are otherwise unconnected, and resolve relationships if they are redundant in terms of 
access and control benefits. More specifically, we have assumed that everyone tries to 
minimize his “network constraint,” Burt’s measure for brokerage. We then answered the 
question “What networks will evolve?” 
In short, the answer is balanced complete bipartite networks. These networks 
consist of two groups of similar size with all intergroup ties and no intragroup ties 
present. Such networks meet the strongest stability criterion, and most simulations ended 
in such networks. The balanced complete bipartite network strongly contrasts with the 
networks commonly depicted in the literature as outcomes of entrepreneurial activity. 
Burt’s typical example of what a network looks like after entrepreneurial activity has 
taken place is that of one actor brokering two dense, otherwise separated groups. 
Moreover, some economic models of network dynamics in information and 
communication settings identify the star as the stable network.  
The difference between these networks is considerable not only in terms of 
structure, but also in the distribution of benefits among the entrepreneurs. Burt’s single-
broker structure and the star are both winner-take-all networks. Balanced complete 
bipartite networks, by contrast, are egalitarian. They benefit each entrepreneur equally. 
Balanced complete bipartite networks have other interesting properties. No one 
really is a broker. Even though each entrepreneur attempts to occupy a brokering 
position, in these equilibria, two-step information flow between any two persons travels 
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Wasserman and Faust 1994: 189-191) is not particularly high for any single actor. 
Moreover, although everybody has a low network constraint, no one has a substantial 
comparative advantage over someone else. Hence the conclusion: If everyone wants to be 
in the center, there is no center.  
The other stable networks that we identified, namely, the symmetric multipartite 
networks, are also egalitarian. Every actor is equally well off. In addition, these networks 
constitute social traps because they are inefficient in terms of their network constraint. 
Especially the even-sized networks that are divided in n/2 groups of size 2 have 
numerous redundant relationships despite their pairwise stability. 
Considering that Burt is often concerned with who has the lowest network 
constraint compared with the others, rather than how low someone’s constraint is in 
absolute terms, one might wonder what happens to our result if actors try to minimize not 
their absolute network constraint but instead the relative network constraint compared 
with those of other actors in the network. Therefore, we analyzed and simulated a model 
in which utility decreases with relative rather than absolute constraint. The relative 
constraint of an actor is his absolute constraint divided by the sum of the absolute 
constraints of the other actors. Results were very similar. Also under this utility function, 
the balanced complete bipartite networks are the dominant networks, in the sense that 
they are pairwise stable and emerge in the majority of simulations. 
Another property of balanced complete bipartite networks is that for n > 4 they 
are not stars. Economists have also recently modeled network dynamics as a process in 
which actors maximize information-based utility. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Bala and 
  31Goyal (2000), and Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2004), using three distinct utility functions, 
all find the star to be the dominant equilibrium network. Goyal and Vega-Redondo even 
contend that their utility function is a measurement for the richness of structural holes in 
someone’s network. Our model does not use the constraint measure for this, as proposed 
by Burt (2005a). A theoretical reason for the difference between the two models is that 
control benefits are not subject to decay over longer paths in Goyal and Vega-Redondo’s 
model. This implies that brokerage of indirectly received information is as valuable as 
brokerage of directly received information. In contrast, Burt’s constraint measure implies 
that brokerage of information one receives indirectly is worthless, and only brokering 
directly received information creates value. Although both assumptions are quite 
extreme, we choose to insist strictly on using the constraint measure for three reasons. 
Actors who take indirect brokerage benefits into account must have information on the 
structure of the entire network. Their model is thus scope-limited to settings in which 
such information is readily available. The actors in our model need to know only which 
of their contacts are in contact with one another and which not. Second, the constraint 
measure has empirically been shown to explain success (see the evidence discussed on 
page 6). And third, Burt (2005b) demonstrates in a recent paper that the returns on 
indirect brokerage are in some contexts not visible at all, and if they are found, they are 
considerably smaller than returns on direct brokerage. The economists do not have a body 
of empirical confirmations to back up their utility functions. 
Still, that different formalizations of theoretically the same concept yield such 
different results begs the question, How robust are our results for changes in assumptions 
on the utility function? Our intuition behind this is that two properties of the network 
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are well chosen, one wants as many ties as possible. Second, closed triads are bad, such 
that you almost never want to create a tie if it closes a triad. This intuition is to some 
extent confirmed by Robins et al. (2005), who find in a stochastic network evolution 
context that networks converge to complete bipartite networks with a low probability of 
closed triads and relatively small costs for having ties in general. In addition, if we would 
add indirect constraint as is done by Burt (2005b) – i.e., an actor’s indirect constraint is 
the average of the constraints of his neighbors  – we would still find the same networks to 
be stable because indirect constraint is optimized, given that each individual constraint is 
optimized. However, this conclusion does not hold if we take into account redundancy 
over two steps; i.e., there is limited new information in multiple contacts if these are 
linked to many of the same third parties (see Reagans et al. 2004 for a generalization of 
constraint in this direction). Complete bipartite networks are full of such redundancies 
over two steps and, therefore, unlikely to be optimal if such redundancies are taken into 
account. 
An important next question is how we can test our results, given that the dominant 
stable network type we found is not the prototypical social network. We know that 
friendship networks tend to be small-world networks – various clusters connected 
through a few intercluster ties (Watts and Strogatz 1998). And we know something about 
the causes. People prefer to associate with people who are like themselves and therefore 
tend to know their contacts’ contacts as well (Homans 1950; Newcombe 1961; Lott and 
Lott 1965; Byrne 1971; Cohen 1977; Verbrugge 1977; Kandel 1978). Segregated 
networks have been shown to be extremely stable (Carley 1991; Mark 1998; Macy et al. 
  332003). However, most of these are settings in which people typically derive additional 
utility rather than disutility from closed triads. Burtian network dynamics are therefore 
not applicable to these settings. Testing the model in such contexts would not be 
appropriate. The settings to which Burt’s network entrepreneurship (and thus also our 
results) applies are competitive settings where non-redundant, first-hand information is 
important. In such settings, balanced complete bipartite networks should be observable.  
In conclusion, we investigated the implication of Burt’s theory of structural holes 
if everyone were a network entrepreneur. In addition, we provided an application of a 
methodology and a stability concept that can be used to study actor-driven network 
evolution. The model, however, is too stylized to predict actual network structures. It 
assumes all actors to be strategic and structural holes to be the only thing that matters. 
Most empirical networks, including those observed in settings in which structural holes 
have been shown to be beneficial, do not resemble complete bipartite networks. 
  Therefore, we finish with some remarks on possible extensions of our analysis. A 
seemingly obvious one would be adding explicit costs for maintaining ties because this is 
common in the literature. This would be particularly interesting if we assumed 
heterogeneity between actors in costs of “bridging” ties. Some actors might be “natural” 
entrepreneurs, while others do not have the inclination or courage to step up to strangers 
and build bridging ties, or they just do not observe these brokerage opportunities. Another 
way to include heterogeneity among actors into the model might be to assume that 
structural holes are not the only things that matter. In many settings, other competing 
incentives will be present, such as balance in friendship networks. As Burt (2005a, ch. 5) 
notes in the last chapter of his recent book, stability might emerge in networks even with 
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interested in brokerage or are not able to observe these structural holes. Finally, 
considering the two types of social capital that Burt (2005a, ch. 3) distinguishes, it may 
be fruitful to use a utility function that is a hybrid of a brokerage-based utility function 
and a closure-based utility function. One could then make the relative importance of 
closure a parameter and study the consequences for network stability. This would change 
our results, because complete bipartite networks do not include any closed triads. Clearly, 
actors who care little about structural holes but a lot about friendship and trust will end up 
in networks full of redundant ties and unexploited brokerage opportunities. 
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Proof of theorem 1. We rewrite the constraint of actor i as: 
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where di is the number of actors i is linked to, j is the index for neighbors of i, and q is the 
index for neighbors of i that are also connected to j. This can be done because pij = 1/di 
for all neighbors j of i. Suppose that two actors i and r can add a tie without creating a 
closed triad. Neither before nor after tie addition are there any actors q who are connected 
to both i and l. Let ci* denote the network constraint of i after the initiation of the new tie, 
and let j continue to stand for the index of neighbors in the old network. Then,  
() ⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+ +
+
≡ ∑∑
jq q i
i d d
c
2
2
* 1
1 1
1
1  
Using straightforward calculations, this implies that 
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Thus, the addition of the new tie necessarily decreases actor i’s network constraint and 
hence increases his utility. Similarly, the constraint decreases for actor r. This completes 
the proof. 
 
Proof of theorem 2. Removing one or more ties is not an option in a complete bipartite 
network because that would create a shortest path longer than 2, and hence it cannot be an 
improvement by corollary 1. Therefore, we need to consider only conditions under which 
group members create a tie within their group. Assume the groups have size k and l with 
k ≤ l and k + l = n. The constraint in the complete bipartite network equals 
k
1
 for actors in 
the group of size l and 
l
1
 for actors in the group of size k. Creating a tie in the larger 
group of l actors changes the constraint of the two actors involved in that tie to  
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because these actors now have one common neighbor with all the actors in the group of 
size k and k common neighbors with each other. In order for the network to be pairwise 
Nash, this expression must be larger than 
k
1
, or  
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Thus, if k = 1,  should hold. Therefore, stars are stable only if there 
are fewer than 4 peripheral actors. If k > 1, then the inequality above is always implied by 
, and this condition is always fulfilled for k > 1. 
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The same expression should hold for actors in the small group, but then with k and l 
reversed:  
  ()
()
()()
22
2 2
21
1
ll l k l
kl l
⎡⎤ ++ +
+> ⎢⎥
+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
2
 (3) 
Inequality (3) is satisfied for any l > 1, l ≥ k ≥ 1, by reasons of symmetry, because (2) 
holds for all k > 1. Note that the case l = k = 1 is irrelevant because no tie can be added. 
This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of theorem 3. Consider an actor i from the smaller group of k ≤ l actors. The 
network constraint of i can be lower in another network only if he has more than l ties 
because 1/l is the minimal constraint one can have with l ties. Let a ≤ k – 1 be this 
additional number of ties of actor i, let j be the index for neighbors of i, and q the index 
for actors that i and j share as neighbors, let πj indicate the proportion of ties of j with 
other neighbors of i, and  j π  the average of all l + a  j π ’s. Then, for i to have a lower 
network constraint, the following inequality must hold: 
() () () ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+
+
=
⎥
⎥
⎦
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⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
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+
≥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+
+
>
jq j jq q jq q d a l d a l d a l l
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
2 2
2
2  
  37() ()
2
11
11 jj
j
a
la l la
⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ π = + π ⇒ π ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ + + ∑ j <  for some j. 
The most difficult step in the derivation above is the first equality, which is implied by 
the fact that for each j the number of times 1/dj should be added due to closed triads is 
equal to number of common neighbors j has with i.  
Note that for each j, to be at least as well off in the new network as in the 
complete bipartite network considered, his degree dj must be at least k. Only k – a – 1 of 
j’s connections can be to actors whom actor i is not connected to, thereby excluding i 
himself. For each j, πj may therefore be no less than a/k: 
j
j
j
dk aaa
dk l
− +
π≥ ≥ ≥  for all j. 
We have reached a contradiction. Thus, to improve i’s network constraint, at least one 
actor j must be given fewer than k neighbors, and this actor is consequently strictly worse 
off in the new network than in the complete bipartite network considered. 
A Pareto-improvement must therefore leave the network constraints of all actors 
with l ties unchanged and give them precisely l ties. This can be done only by keeping all 
ties that connect such an actor with an actor with l ties, or in the case of k = l, by 
switching to a network that contains a different k by l complete bipartite network. The 
only remaining possibility for a Pareto-improvement is then the addition of one or more 
ties between actors with k ties. But any such addition involves the creation of triangles 
and hence increases the network constraint of all actors with l ties. This renders the 
assumed Pareto-improvement impossible and completes the proof. 
 
  38Proof of theorem 4. If. Consider an actor i from the group of k actors. We know from the 
proof of theorem 3 that we cannot make this actor better off without letting one of his 
neighbors have a degree lower than k. But leaving the ties that do not involve actor i 
unchanged, all his neighbors have at least degree k. In the even case, in which k = l, by 
symmetry, this impossibility of unilateral improvement extends to actors of the group of 
size l. The single remaining possibility for unilateral improvement is therefore a 
permitted decrement of the constraint of an actor i from the group of l actors in the 
uneven case, in which k = l – 1. Let 0 ≤ bk ≤ k be the number of ties actor i has with actors 
from the group of size k in the new network, and let 0 ≤ bl ≤ k be the number of ties he 
has with actors from the group of size l. Again, leave the ties that do not involve actor i 
unchanged. Because these ties constitute the balanced bipartite network with k = l − 1 
actors in each group, the following inequality must hold: 
()
() ()
() ( )
22 22
2 22
11 11
11
11 1
kl lk lk
kl
kl kl
bb k bb k bb
bb
kk k bb bb k
⎛⎞ ++ + ++ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ >+ + + = ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ++ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ++ ⎝⎠
⇔
+
2
 
() () () () () () ()
22 2 2 2 22 2 12 1 1 12 1 12 1 lk l k k k l k l l k l l k b k b bk b k b kk b b kk b bk b kk b b kk b bk ++ ++ +> ++ + + + ++ + + ⇔  
() () () ( ) ( )( )
22 2 22 2 12 1 1 1 1 1 lk l k k k l l l k b k b b k k b kb k kb b k b k kb b k +− − + + +> ++ + ++ ⇔
2 2  
() () ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
12 kk ll k l k l bb k bb k k b b b bk k k ⎡⎤ ⎡ −+ − + > + + − + ⎣⎦ ⎣ 1 1 . ⎤ ⎦  
The left-hand side of this last inequality is never strictly positive, and the right-hand side 
is never strictly negative. Hence, it cannot be satisfied. 
Only if. If l – k > 1, an actor from the larger group of l actors can delete all his ties with 
actors from the smaller group of k actors and add l – 1 ties to the other actors from the 
larger group of l actors. By doing so, she decreases her constraint from 
k
1
 to 
1
1
− l
. By 
  39permitting this change, the l – 1 actors see their constraint fall from 
k
1
 to 
1
1
+ k
. This 
completes the proof. 
 
Proof of theorem 5. Denote n2 a factor of n. Then for a complete n/n2-partite network 
with equal groups of n2 size, the following inequality should hold such that no one wants 
to severe a tie (note that we need only one equation because all actors have regularly 
equivalent positions).  
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For no actor to benefit from adding any of his equivalent potential ties in this complete 
n/n2-bipartite network with equal-sized groups, the following inequality must hold: 
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43 2 3 2 2 2 2 2
22 2 2 2 2 2 2 ( 76) ( 1 21 8) ( 41 6)4 2 5 4 0 ,  w h e r e   . 2 x nx nx n x nx nx n x n n x n n −+ − +− −+ + + + < = −  
Since n2 < x = n – n2, the equation above is implied by (replacing  )  2
2
2 by    xn n
, 0 3 ) 12 4 ( ) 13 12 ( ) 4 7 ( 2 2
2
2
3
2
4 < − − + − + − xn n x n x n x  
which is true because n2 ≥ 2 and x > 0. This completes the proof. 
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  48Table 1. Number of networks (found) for various stability criteria (note that we do not 
have any guarantee that we have all pairwise stable networks for networks with n > 10). 
 
n 
Non-isomorphic 
networks Connected 
Pairwise 
stable Pairwise  Nash 
Unilaterally 
stable 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
2 
4 
11 
34 
156 
1044 
12346 
274668 
12.01e6 
10.19e8 
16.51e10 
50.50e12 
29.05e15 
31.43e18 
64.00e21 
1
2
6
21
112
853
11117
261080
11.72e6
10.07e8
16.41e10
50.34e12
29.00e15
31.40e18
63.97e21
1
1
2
2
4
3
10
9
14
≥13
≥25
≥17
≥21
≥34
≥43
1
1
2
2
3
3
7
7
9
≥8
≥12
≥8
≥10
≥16
≥21
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
≥1 
≥1 
≥1 
≥1 
≥2 
≥2 
 
  49Table 2. Simulation results  
 
n Number  of 
starting 
networks 
Different pairwise 
stable networks in 
simulation 
% Balanced 
complete 
bipartite 
% Just unbalanced 
complete bipartite 
(difference in size 
between groups is 2 or 3)
Correlation density 
starting network – 
resulting network 
2  2  1 1  n.a.  n.a. 
3 4  1  1  n.a.  n.a. 
4 11  2  .86  .14  .24 
5 34  2  .81  n.a.  .17 
6 156  4  .71  .18  .41 
7 1044  3  .63  .03  .10 
8 12346  10  .62  .15  .21 
9 9292  9  .87  .01  .29 
10 10070  11  .69  .23  .21 
11 10898  12  .88  .04  .28 
12 10930  23  .61  .31  .26 
13 5078  15  .81  .05  .34 
14 5700  18  .54  .30  .37 
15 6358  31  .79  .06  .37 
16 7062  39  .51  .30  .44 
17 2346  35  .79  .06  .44 
18 2666  42  .53  .32  .46 
19 3006  44  .79  .07  .43 
20 3366  56  .52  .34  .42 
21 3746  59  .77  .08  .45 
22 4146  73  .50  .35  .43 
23 4566  86  .75  .09  .47 
24 5006  107  .50  .33  .47 
25 5466  110  .74  .10  .48 
  50Figure 1. The constraint measure; three example networks. 
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  51Figure 2. Some pairwise stable networks. Numbers are constraint values. Box, 4-star, 
Pentagon, Bag, and 10-actor balanced complete bipartite network are also unilaterally 
stable. 
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